By SHELDON F. DUDLEY.
(Surgeon Commander, Royal Navy.) IT is as well to begin by explaining exactly what I mean by the adjective typhoid. The nanmes of certain diseases are often used in two distinct senses, depending on the definition employed. A patient, irrespective of any presumed biological agent, may be labelled as suffering from a certain illness, provided he shows certain signs and symptoms; or the clinical syndrome may be considered of minor importance, and the name of the illness decided by the organism which is presumed to cause it. Unfortunately there is no convention as to which nomenclature should be used; prejudice, custom, or the prominence of certain organs or symptoms in the clinical picture, decides the question one way as often as the other. Typhoid fever is a good example of a medical term which has been given various meanings at different times. When I learnt " fevers," typhoid had of course been differentiated from typhus fever, but some other fevers had yet not been separated from typhoid. I was taught that any long-continued fever which obviously was not something else, such as tuberculosis or malaria, should be called typhoid fever. Thus typhoid fever became a sort of pigeon-hole in which was placed all that group of fevers which, at a later date in the Army were more cautiously, and honestly, labelled as P.U.O. Advances in bacteriology showed that many cases, which could be diagnosed as typhoid fever under the most stringent of clinical definitions, were caused by organisms which the systematic biologist would refuse to classify as B. typhosus. These organisms were B. paratyphossus A and B. After the recognition of these organisms it became a habit to limit the adjective typhoid to those fevers caused by B. typhosus; and because the fevers due to B. typhosus, and those caused by paratyphoid bacilli, were often clinically indistinguishable, the term " enteric fever" was used to include the whole group. Further advances in medicine showed that during the prevalence of typhoid there were many cases with mild symptoms which no physician of a former generation would have diagnosed as typhoid, but wbich were undoubtedly due to infection with B. tylphosus. Therefore it is possible to have on the one hand clinically identical fevers due to separate species of bacteria, and on the other hand conditions clinically different, although due to the same biological agent. For this reason it became the custom to reserve the term typhoid fever for all fevers considered to he caused by B. typhosius irrespective of the clinical picture. Even this definition is not as simple as it sounds, because I have seen cases of suppurative cholecystitis, or periostitis, with no history of clinical typhoid fever, in which the pus from the gall-bladder, or bone sinus, contained B. typhosuts in pure culture.
Such cases can scarcely be called typhoid fever without qualification, because the gall-bladder, or bone lesions, dominate the situation. In enteric fevers all orders of severity can be found, from the mild ambulant case, scarcely ill, up to the toxtemic rapidly fatal case. This is so striking that a thoughtful observer might wonder if there was a type of typhoid fever milder than the mildest amulant case, i.e., a case without fever or any other symptoms. This type of case has been found, but ol course can only be recognized for certain by the discovery of B. typhosus in the excreta. As it would be unconventional to call such non-symptomatic cases typhoid fever, custom has christened them "contact carriers." The whole carrier problem, MH-W 1 Dudley: Epidemiology of Typhoid Fever in the Royal Navy however, becomes much simpler if one remembers that the " contact-carrier " is merely the limiting case of a clinical condition. A few cases of enteric fever (including " contact carriers ") become tolerant to the specific causative organisms, which may then live for longer or shorter periods within these individuals which are the chronic and convalescent carriers. Though carriers of enteric fevers may not have symptoms, their blood often differs from normal blood in several particulars, especially in the power of agglutinating the causative organisms of the disease they carry.
Here the discussion on the meaning of typhoid fever might drop, but further confusion has arisen by loose usage of "enteric."' I think enteric was originally a convenient name for the group of typhoid and paratyphoid infections when it was not required to distinguish them bacteriologically. However, during the war, at a time when a heterogeneous multitude of intestinal infections appeared at the hospitals for diagnosis, all were often loosely termed "enteric." These infections included the dysenteries, as well as cases caused by the Salmonella bacteria. The latter bacteria can cause symptoms that nicely fill the clinical gap between ordinary typhoid fever and dysentery. The Salmonella bacteria are a group of organisms closely related to B. paratyphoid B; and its species, subspecies, and varieties are so very much alike that they--like the Flexner group of dysentery bacilli-often lead the inexperienced investigator into errors of diagnosis, and further confuse the nomenclature. Luckily, however, B. typhosuts is probably one of the easiest of pathogenic bacteria to recognize, for it has a distinct serological individuality and other stable and definite characters; but these specific characters must be demonstrated before any bacillus is labelled B. typhosus. This is an important point, because many, who are not practical bacteriologists, do not realize the difficulty of finding and identifying the pathogenic intestinal bacteria. If the above difficulties in nomenclature are borne in mind, misunderstanding need not often occur, as the context of a paper will generally render clear in what sense an author uses a term like typhoid, enteric, dysentery, or gastro-enteritis. In this paper the adjective typhoid is only used to qualify a condition which is considered to be due to that specific obligatory parasite of man which is usually known as Bacillus typhosus. The first outbreak of typhoid fever which I discuss occurred some years ago. This epidemic was remarkable for the number of mild cases which were so much in evidence, that at first it was tbought the ship was infected with influenza. The reasons why the outbreak was considered to be wholly one of typhoid fever, and neither influenza, nor an influenza outbreak running concurrently with one of typhoid fever, are:-(1) All the medical officers in the hospitals and ships concerned were ultimately convinced that all these patients had typhoid fever.
(2) No case gave a negative Widal reaction. The positive agglutination results cannot be attributed to previous inoculation with antityphoid vaccine, because, of the mild cases, twenty-two who had never been inoculated had sera which flocculated B. typhosus in titres of 1: 80 or over.
(3) In my experience of influenza in ships, it is unknown for an epidemic to last over fifty days, and to attack 10 per cent. of the men, and at the same time for all the officers to escape. It is unlikely that the partial isolation of the seventy officers in the ship in question would protect them from a " droplet "-born infection with the characters of influenza, whereas a separate food supply readily accounts for their escape from typhoid.
The clinical aspect of these cases is seen in a rep)ort on sixty-eight of the epidemic cases which were treated in a military hospital. Thirty-two were classified as " mild " or " very mild," the rest as " ordinary " or " severe." Among the severe cases seven suffered from intestinal htemorrhages and two perforated their intestines. A fatal case showed characteristic lesions in Peyer's patches. In the ship itself thirteen cases were returned to duty within ten days (subsequently these men were sent to a hospital ship for bacteriological examination). Of the ninety-seven cases comprising the epidemic, seven died, a case mortality of 7 per cent., which is low for typhoid fever. The chief characteristic of the epidemic seems to have been the mildness of about half the cases. Some patients treated in the ship onlly had a iise of temperature for two or three days. On the other hand, severe and fatalcases were scattered throughout the whole epidemic period. The graduation in the severity is an interesting clinical observation. The mildness of the cases cannot be attributed entirely to the previous inoculation of about 30 per cent. of the patients, because over two-thirds of the mild cases gave no history of previous antityphoid vaccination. This gradation of symptoms, from the ambulant case who feels almost in ordinary health, through all degrees of severity up to the fatal case, can be found in many infections, e.g., gonorrhcea, infantile paralysis, yellow fever, or
influenza. An ascending series of orders of severity is more obvious to ships' doctors than to their colleagues ashore, because in a ship the doctor sees the whole field of an epidemic at once. He may have over 1,000 men under his care, and he sees everyone who is not well enough to w1ork (and many more besides).
Thus numerous trivial ca.ses come under the naval surgeon's notice, cases which, if ashore, would never have been seen by a doctor. Also, when typical clinical cases of an infectious disease are prevalent in a ship, it is much easier to suspect and diagnose many atypical infections which might have been missed had they been seen, one by one, in separate houses ashore. The gradual shading off of signs and symptoms down to the mildest of recognizable ambulant cases by itself postulates the case with no symptoms at all. In fact, the contact-carrier, i.e., the case without symptomsF should in this way have been logically deduced by the physician long before he was discovered to be a reality by the bacteriologist.
The severity of the typhoid epidemic in question may have been lower than usual.
But the mildness, relative to apparent shore experience, was exaggerated, because it is likely, if the same cases had been distributed among a dozen practitioners ashore, that only the typical and severe cases would have been notified, and the fatality would have appeared as 14 per cent. instead of 7 per cent. Fig. 1 is an incidence histogram of the nlinety-seven cases which comprised this outbreaki. The dotted line is a smoothed curve, and shows that the outbreak consisted of two clearly defined waves. The first has an acute peak due to the fact that twenty-seven cases occurred in the first week. This explosive onset suggests infection by water or food. After a fall in the number of cases during the second week, the curve rises gradually to another definite peak, and then falls still more slowly. The flatter curve suggests that the second wave cases were not directly due to mass infection of food or water but that certain food supplies were infected at different times by the victims of the first wave.
The incubation period of typhoid is about five to twenty days. The duration of incubation also varies, with the dose of infection, the type of host, and the local strain of B. typhosus. However, the mean incubation period in this outbreak is indicated by the distance between the two peaks on the incidence curve as being about twelve days. If all of the first wave cases were infected from the same source on the same day, this source should be found about twelve days previous to the first peak of the epidemic, i.e., the original infection was introduced into the ship about eight days before the onset of the first case.
Thus, an examination of the incidence curve only, suggests that the ship was infected by food or water about a week before the first case fell ill. The water, which was examined on several occasions, more than satisfied the usual chemical and bacteriological tests. No water had been used except distilled water, made on board, or water supplied from a source which had given cause for anxiety neither ashore nor in any other ship. The infection was unlikely to have been contracted outside the ship because twelve out of the first twenty cases had not been ashore for more than a month. The food supplied to the ship was investigated. No shell-fish had been eaten, but it was found that thirteen, twelve and six days previous to the onset, uncooked radishes or lettuces had been served. The greenstuffs eaten on the first two occasions were obtained from a source used by all the ships on the station without apparent harm. But on the last occasion 500 lettuces from another locality were distributed to all the ship's company except the officers. The day this lettuce was eaten was only two days later than the date indicated by the incidence curve as the most likely time for the introduction of the infection. The circumstantial evidence incriminating the lettuces is increased by the escape of the seventy officers, who returned no case of typhoid fever presumablybecause they ate none of this lettuce. Two other possible causes of the outbreak must be excluded. The ship's comipany, but again not the officers, were given fried fish about two weeks before the epidemic started. Sir William Hamer [11has shown that small, flat fish which are improperly cleaned, cooked, orhandled in the fried fish shops can convey B. typhosuts to the intestines of their consumers. These small fish get infected in the sewage-polluted river estuaries they inhabit. In H.M. ships the method of cooking fish was undoubtedly safer than in a fish shop, and, also, the fish in question were neither small, flat, nor from an estuary.
The other possibility is that the food supply was infected by a carrier of B. typhosus. The outbreak, however, did not follow the usual course of one due to a carrier, where entirely unexplained cases appear at irregular intervals. A bacteriological examination of all likely ratings, made during the epidemic, failed to demonstrate anycarrier who could have been responsible for the outbreak. In my opinion it is almost a certainty that the epidemic was started by the suspected lettuce.
Figures showing the effect of previous antityphoid vaccination on the incidence of the disease were obt ained from the notes of the cases treated in hospital, and from the men's medical history sheets.
In this table the " No information " figure includes an unknown number of men who had been inoculated during the war, and at a time when it was neither customary, norpossible, to enter the data of inoculation on a medicalhistory sheet.
'788
Therefore, if the inoculation records had been complete, the "over the year" total would have increased at the expense of the " no information" figure in fig. 2 , and the ratio of the inoculated to uninoculated attack rates would have been greater than a half. But, even as the figures stand, the difference between the morbidity of the inoculated and the uninoculated men is statistically significant, i.e., the lower incidence in the inoculated group was due to some difference between the two groups, which difference was almost certainly the administration of the T.A.B. vaccine to one of them.
When it was realized that typhoid fever was epidemic in this ship, the whole ship's company were inoculated. Following which the epidemic ceased. However, it is most important to notice that before the prophylactic inoculation could have had any effect, the curve of incidence was well on the decline, and, except for two or three cases, the epidemic was over.
In my opinion the epidemic had run its course, and would have terminated even without any preventive measures. While I admit the inoculations which were performed towards the end of the epidemic may have prevented some cases, I would warn enthusiasts from seizing on the fact that the end of the outbreak coincided with the antityphoid inoculation of the crew, as evidence of the efficiency of T.A.B. TI,rE ELAPsNXG. vaccine. The cessation of symptoms, whether in an individual or a herd, often coincides with the application of some supposed remedy. The use of " because of," as a synonym for " in spite of " treatment so often seems to escape the notice of patients and medical men, that an example of this common fallacy applied to the treatment of epidemics may be instructive.
In 1918, attacks of influenza in ships were usually characterized by an alarming rush of cases followed by an almost sudden cessation. Therefore, if there was time for measures to be applied before the epidemic was over, the application had to be followed, within a day or two at least, by a diminution in the daily incidence. A ship's company, of even 1,000 men, cannot produce 100 fresh cases a day indefinitely-a figure actually reached by some battleships during 1918. But human nature being what it is, and the doctor liking to feel he has done some good, persuades himself (perhaps unconsciously) that the sudden cessation of influenza cases, which must take place in any event, is caused by his prophylactic efforts. The faith of the laity encourages and perpetuates this " post hoc ergo propter hoc " fallacy.
In 1918 I made deliberate use of this fallacy. In H.M. Hospital Ship Agadir, I had a large stock of formalin candles. When harassed medical officers from the influenza-stricken fleet came on board asking what to do, with half the crew on the sick list, and the captain beseeching them to stem the plague, I gave them 3 or 4 formalin candles, with instructions to burn them with as much ritual as possible and to distribute the candles so as to make everyone in the ship cry. These ceremonial candles always " produced " a satisfactory result, as the visitation had to cease within a few days, if not at once. Also the crew recovered their nerve, for they realized that a " medicine " powerful enough to make them weep must be too much for any disease germ. The captain of the ship appreciated the skill of the medical officer, and all was peace once more. Although the formaldehyde concentration due to a few candles on the mess deck of a battleship is far too dilute to have any disinfecting effect on the paint work, let alone on a sailor's mucous membrane, yet the psychological effect was not inconsiderable. After all, some medical officers, whose opinion may be worth as much as mine, swore by these formalin lamps, in spite of the fact that although this form of incense could not harm the influenza germ, yet it might exorcise the demons of panic and anxiety.
Antityphoid vaccination, however, is undoubtedly a sound preventive measure, hence it may not be so easy to see why the termination of the typhoid fever epidemic we have been discussing is not considered to have been due to the coincident antityphoid inoculation of the ship's company. I hope presently to make clear the reason for this opinion. It is important to understand this point, otherwise an incautious supporter of vaccine prophylaxis might arrange the morbidity figures in some way as this: " Before inoculation the attack-rate was twenty-seven per week. After inoculation the rate fell to only two per week," which, though a fact, does not prove that the prophylactic vaccination affected the incidence, unless it can be shown that other conditions, e.g., the herd-immunity of the population, had remained unchanged throughout the whole period. It is unconsidered statements such as the example given, that anti-vaccination fanatics are waiting to pounce on.
The cases of typhoid fever were fairly distributed throughout the different messes. The only living spaces clear from cases were the officers' quarters, which occupied the whole of the after-part of the ship. Fig. 3 depicts the ship's company grouped as far as possible in the order of their length of service in the Royal Navy.
The chief points of interest in this table are the high morbidity (47 per cent.) among volunteers, and the low attack-rate (3 per cent.) of the boys and ordinary War Section 29 seamen. The volunteers were mostly youths aged from 18 to 20 who had only been a month or two at sea, but with them were a sprinkling of older men, some of whom were over 30 and had served in the war and therefore were well seasoned to TYPHOID NORBPmDITY 11 A SHIP. naval life. All the volunteers attacked by typhoid fever were youngsters, the older and more experienced escaped altogether. In spite of this, the total morbidity of the volunteers was much higher than that of any other group. The boys and ordinary seamen were the next group with the least experience of life in the Navy; they were also the youngest group. Therefore, they might have been expected to have suffered most, but their attack-rate was only one-sixteenth that of the volunteers, and the lowest recorded among those groups who were definitely known to have been infected by B. typhosus. The more senior group of leadingand able-seamen suffered five times as heavily as the junior group of boys and ordinary seamen. This would have been difficult to explain, presuming both groups encountered the same number of typhoid bacilli, had not the medical officer of the ship, in his official report on typhoid fever, definitely stated that all the boys and ordinary seamen in the ship, to the number of about 130, were inoculated within two months of the onset of the epidemic. Elsewhere [2] I have shown that infectious diseases always attack most heavily those groups of the population which have least experience of the environment. Therefore it seems legitimate to conclude that the low morbidity of the ordinary seamen and boys was due to the fact that they were the only group who had. been recently and completely inoculated with T.A.B. vaccine, otherwise they should have had a much higher attack-rate. The ableand leading-seamen had all in their time been boys and ordinary seamen, but none had been inoculated recently and most had not been inoculated at all. Therefore the Ihigh attack-rate (16 per cent.) of the poorly protected senior seamen, in contrast to the low attack-rate (3 per cent.) of junior seamen, is a good testimonial to T.A.B. vaccine. It is worth noting that the chief petty officers-the most senior men to partake of the suspected lettucewere not attacked at all by typhoid fever. The absence of all infection among the officers, in spite of the young unseasoned midshipmen amongst them, is attributable to their partial isolation and separate food supply.
For some years I have been labouring the point, that in nearly all instances when age seems an important factor in the susceptibility to infection, as shown by higher morbidity in the young, the real factor is not age in itself, but the amount of previous bacterial experience. This mistake concerning age has arisen because the social class and environment of the majority of the population ashore remain unchanged, and therefore age, on the average, is proportional to the amount of contact in the past between the parasites and the hosts, indigenous to the environment. In the crowded life of the Services the bacterial environment is more dense and variable than in any ordinary dwelling ashore. For this reason Service recruits are always more prone than are seasoned men to the attacks of infectious disease.
The seasoning of troops is largely a process of natural vaccination. In the congested conditions of barrack or ship life, men are continually ingesting subinfective doses of all kinds of pathogenic bacteria, or their dead products, and in this way their resistance to many diseases is augmented. In several instances in my own experience I have found contacts of typhoid fever cases whose blood-serum agglutinated B. typhosuts titres of over 1: 1,000. I at first thought such cases were intermittent carriers, though repeated efforts to obtain the specific bacillus from their excreta failed. I now regard these cases as men who had been in contact with B. typhosus but had never developed febrile symptoms. The contact, however, was sufficient to stimulate production of agglutiniins in their blood, and they may, or may not, have been "contact-carriers " for a variable time. In addition to such men, who have no history of fever but possess detectable specific changes in their blood, Besredka's work on local immunity, and the oral administration of vaccines, make it not unlikely that during the prevalence of typhoid fever individuals may gain immunity, or enhanced resistance to B. typhosus, without even developing specific agglutinins in their blood-serum. During an epidemic of typhoid as widespread as that just described, one would expect many men to develop immunity without symptoms. Unfortunately circumstances made it impossible to test the truth of this hypothesis by examining the agglutination reactions of a large number of uninoculated, and apparently unattacked, men. However, there is considerable evidence in the literature that the ingestion of subinfective doses of intestinal bacteria can produce the carrier state, or antibodies in the blood or tissues, i.e., immunity without symptoms. Some examples are: In a Japanese college [4] seventy-seven inmates developed paratyphoid fever; 6 per cent. proved to be passing paratyphoid bacilli, whereas of 159 healthy contact cases 3 per cent. were passing B. paratyphosus. The technique of isolation was only successful in 6 per cent. of the cases with symptoms. If we assume that the percentage of success was no greater in the non-symptomatic infections, it must mean that about eighty of the healthy contacts were carriers of paratyphoid bacilli.
In 1909 some German soldiers ate a salad prepared by a carrier. Twenty-nine got typhoid fever, but 129, over four times the number of patients, showed contact with B. typhosts by developing a positive Widal reaction. These apparently healthy men were nearly all room mates of the cases [5] . Again, Duke [6] has shown that 5-4 per cent. of the natives of Uganda, owing presumably to their crude sanitation, have sera which will agglutinate one or other of the enteric fever organisms in a dilution of over 1: 50. A last piece of indirect evidence is instructive. In a German province [7] before the war the incidence of paratyphoid was equal in men and women. After the war nearly 40 per cent. more women than men suffered from paratyphoid, yet inoculation against paratyphoid was not practised in the German army, and therefore cannot account for the difference in morbidity. The increased herd immunity of the male German seems to me to be due to the adaptation of the male population to the bacterial environment of barrack and trench life by natural autovaccination. It will be interesting to see if the difference between the attack rates of the sexes is wiped out as years of peace pass by.
For such reasons, when crowded environments such as warships experience a big outbreak of infectious disease, those who escape attack do not always do so because they have avoided contact with the causative parasites, but because the doses of infection they receive are not large enough to overcome their individual resistance. The ingestion of such subinfective doses is Nature's method of vaccination, by means of which many hosts become able to withstand subsequent attacks of much larger numbers of parasites than they could otherwise have done. Professor Topley's [8] researches on mouse typhoid epidemics clearly prove that the mice which survive an epidemic have not escaped infection, because in no less than 70 per cent. of 267 mice which had survived for various periods after the cessation of an epidemic, B. aertrycke, the causative organism, was recovered from the spleen. For these reasons I think we are justified in concluding that in our ship epidemic many more than the thirty who were ill with fever in the first wave must have eaten typhoid bacilli with their lettuce, and later many others must have had food or drink contaminated by earlier cases or contact carriers. Such men were not infected with typhoid fever, because they received too few bacilli to overcome whatever natural or specific resistance they already possessed. Instead, their specific resistance was augmented by the subinfective doses of B. typhosus, and the herd immunity of the ship as a whole so much increased that typhoid fever could no longer spread. This, to my mind, is the most probable explanation of the end of this epidemic.
To refer again to fig. 3 , it is possible that the high morbidity of the volunteers and the escape of the chief petty officers, the most senior group of lower deck ratings, can be explained by the hypothesis of autovaccination by subinfective doses. The senior group, during long residence in the dense naval environment, had ingested many kinds of intestinal bacilli, which, even if they did not include B. typhosus,
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may have augmented the resistance of their intestines to bacterial attack of any sort. The senior ratings were vaccinated naturally by the bacilli they had swallowed in the past, in an analogous manner to the boys, who gained immunity artificially by contact with dead bacilli out of bottles.
The difference between the incidence of typhoid fever among the able and leading seamen and other ratings of about the same length of service is statistically significant; but I can suggest no very obvious explanation for this anomaly. Perhaps it was due to the distribution of the inoculated individuals, concerning which I have no data, among the different groups of ratings. On the other hand, perhaps the senior seamen ate more than their fair share of lettuce. The distribution of lettuce could, but is unlikely to, have accounted for all the phenomena fig. 4 illustrates; because even if an equal amount of lettuce had been eaten by every man in the ship, it by no means follows B. typhosus was equally spread over each of 500 lettuces. Therefore I carefully said the hypothesis of autovaccination by previous bacterial ingestion could, but did not necessarily, explain some peculiarities in the distribution of cases among the different groups of men in the afflicted ship.
The outbreak indicated that the inoculations performed before the epidemic had limited to some extent the total morbidity. In my opinion the most striking evidence of this was the low attack rate of the boys and ordinary seamen who had been inoculated shortly before the onset of the epidemic, otherwise, being the most susceptible group, they would have been expected to have suffered most. Although antityphoid inoculation needs no further testimonial, yet naval experience suggests that, in order to get its full protective effect, the uninoculated members of a community should be reduced to the lowest number possible. Not only because the fewer there are unprotected the fewer will be susceptible to attack, but also because the greater the number unprotected, the greater is the chance that those who have been vaccinated may obtain a dose of infection massive enough to overcome any increase of resistance due to the vaccine. It must always be remembered that the protection against enteric fever conferred by T.A.B. vaccine is not nearly as absolute, or as lasting, as the immunity to small-pox given by calf vaccine. The incidence of typhoid fever in the protected men in the ship was about half that in the unprotected. This is about the same ratio as was seen in the Army during the war. I am not a fanatic on protective vaccination, against either typhoid fever or small-pox. It is very debatable whether either is worth while, as a routine, among the stay-at-home civilian population of a country where the health organization is as advanced as in England, provided power and means are given to health authorities to enforce preventive vaccination immediately circumstances render it advisable. The Royal Navy, however, gives "leave " in all sorts of foreign places where sanitation is crude or absent, and many sailors, though warned of the danger, will not realize they cannot eat and drink everything abroad with the same impunity as at home. Also a fighting ship necessarily having one of the densest populations in the world, is from this point of view an ideal environment for the spread of infectious disease. Hence a protective vaccine of proved efficiency is a valuable second line of defence to ship sanitation; therefore prophylactic inoculation against enteric fever should be compulsory throughout the fighting Services.
I will now briefly describe a few aspects of an outbreak of typhoid fever in another ship. These cases present some interesting contrasts with those just described.
The outbreak comprised twenty cases and was entirely confined to the boys and two of the canteen staff. Twelve of the attacked boys sat at the same table. An incidence histogram of this small epidemic is given in fig. 1 under that of the larger one. This diagram is so placed that the onset of the two epidemics correspond.
From the experience gained in the large epidemic, we can imagine this small outbreak also to consist of two waves, as indicated by the dotted line. The peaks of this admittedly rather artificial curve are about fourteen days apart. Therefore the infection was probably introduced into the boys' mess about fourteen days before the peak of the first wave, i.e., six days before the onset of the first case. It is interesting to note thas this probable date of infection is the same, relative to the onset of the epidemic, as that on which the infected lettuce was distributed in the first ship. This is a genuine coincidence. I had drawn the incidence curve for the small outbreak before I thought of superimposing it on the other. In the notes of this small outbreak it is stated that "it appeared certain that the infection was due to a small batch of food partaken of only by the canteen staff and No. 36 mess boys...." Unfortunately there is no record of a date on which any such special dish was eaten. The typhoid fever cases in this instance were practically restricted to the boys; one of the least affected groups in the first mentioned epidemic. This was doubtless due to massive infection from a special disb. In the present case the ship's company were efficiently inoculated, which may have prevented secondary cases spreading beyond the primary focus of infection. In the larger outbreak the infection was general from the start, as the ship's company, with the exception of the boys, was very poorly protected with antityphoid vaccine, secondary infections had less difficulty in establishing themselves. Fig. 4 shows these twenty cases of typhoid fever used to illustrate two other points: A note of the duration of fever in each patient had been kept. In fig. 4 each column represents a case and its height is proportional to the duration of pyrexia. Diagram A, fig. 4 , gives the cases arranged from one with no pyrexia up to a patient who had nine weeks of fever. A twenty-first boy was added to complete diagram A. This lad had no appreciable illness, but his serum agglutinated B. typhosus up to 1 : 5,000. He was probably the type of host who acquires immunity during an epidemic without any symptoms of illness.
Diagram B (fig. 4) shows the cases, with duration of fever, in order of incidence and illustrates a phenomenon often seen in epidemics, i.e., the earlier cases as a whole tend to be more severe than the later ones. The diagram is divided into two groups, twelve supposed to have been primarily infected from the original polluted food, and eight considered to have been infected from these primary cases. The average duration of pyrexia in the primary group is 4x7 weeks, while the secondary group averaged only 2 x 8 weeks of fever. This phenomenon may depend on a more massive original dose in the primary cases (as may well have happened in the present example) or as sometimes occurs in other infections when some increase of immunity in the later cases of the epidemic is acquired by auto-vaccination during the earlier stages. It may be noted, however, if the above grouping is considered artificial, that it does not matter within limits where the division between early and late cases is made, the latter always show a smaller average duration of fever. In the larger epidemic the data were insufficient to elucidate this point or the phenomenon of apparent diminution of virulence may not have been present on that occasion.
I will now refer to a series of typhoid fever cases in a battleship which show quite a different distribution in time and place from those discussed previously. Between April, 1911, and March, 1914, HI.M.S. Formidable had reported twentyeight cases of typhoid fever, which arose one or two at a time at irregular intervals. During the last two years of this period several meetings of medical officers were convened to investigate the continued prevalence of typhoid fever in the Formidable, which was getting more than her fair share of this infection. I was only ordered to attend the last meeting, where I first heard the details of the Forrmidable's history during the previous three years. Many possible causes of typhoid fever, all common to other ships of the Home Fleet, which had suffered no unusual typhoid fever incidence, had been considered and practically excluded during the previous two years. Among the suggested causes were polluted water, shell-fish, bacilli on the paint work, or in the cracks of the cement floors of the latrine, sand from the contaminated foreshore of Sheerness, mud brought on board by the cable, flies, and even "motile bacilli " in the baker's yeast. The total evidence was so clear that when asked for my opinion I could reply at once: " There is a carrier of B. typhosus in the ship, who is one of the ratings who joined the ship before 796 Fl April, 1911. Whether I shall be able to find him is another matter, but he is there all the same." Fourteen days later B. typhosus was isolated from the stools of one of the fifty ratings who had served in the ship since April, 1911. This man's removal coincided with the cessation of typhoid fever in H.M.S. Formidable, just as his advent to the ship had coincided with the start of its prevalence. " Carrier " was not a household word before the war, and none of the senior officers who held the inquiry were bacteriologists. Hence they can easily be forgiven for overlooking the fact that the Formidable had kept an "invisible case " of typhoid infection permanently on board for three years. The full details of this chronic carrier's history were reported at the time [9] . It suffices to say now that he had had typhoid fever in 1898, and had served in twelve ships and barracks between that time and joining H.M.S. Formidable. All these ships returned one or more cases of typhoid fever while this chronic carrier was in them. He was a ship's cooper. Part of his duties was to open cases of food and to assist in their distribution to the ship's company. Thus this carrier had ample opportunities of sometimes infecting articles of food. The infections were attributed to the carrier chiefly because they so often occurred in men who had not been ashore for months, or even, on one occasion, when no leave had been given to any of the ship's company for over a month, and also because by no means could the infection be traced to other common sources, such as fish, impure water, or another case. Sir William Hamer [10] , however, suggested, in one of his illuminating addresses on epidemiology, that I was wrong to attribute these cases to the ship's cooper, because, for one thing, if the incidence of typhoid fever was the same as that ashore, the twenty cases which occurred in the ships in which this man had served previous to H.M.S. Formidable might have been expected in the ordinary course of events.
From the available exact statistics for typhoid fever in the Navy a simple calculation shows that for the average population at risk from this carrier the expected number would have been eight or nine less than half the number reported. However, statistics used in this way are not satisfactory in this case. The population at risk was far from homogeneous, consisting as it did of different groups of men serving as separate communities in various parts of the world. An epidemic like that first discussed could produce fifty years' supply of typhoid fever for an average sample of 1,000 men in a couple of months, while other ships may easily go for five or more years without returning a case of typhoid fever. More striking arithmetical evidence -connecting this carrier with the typhoid fever is that all the ships, without any exception, returned a case, or cases, of typhoid fever while harbouring this carrier. The health returns of the Navy between 1898-and 1910 show that in each year less than one quarter of all sea-going battleships and cruisers return a case of typhoid fever. Roughly, the problem can be put thus:-If a man joins a different ship each year for ten years in a navy where only one ship in four per year returns one or more typhoid fever infections, what is the probability of his always selecting by chance a ship that will report a case of typhoid fever during the year he is in her ? The answer is obviously (i) , i.e., the odds are over a million to one against this carrier found in the Formidable having no etiological connexion with any of the cases of typhoid fever which occurred on board the ships he had served in between 1898 and 1912.
In the same paper just mentioned, Sir William Hamer humorously suggests I should have made my carrier responsible for some cases of enteric fever among the officers of H.M.S. Euryalus after a feast of oysters. This set me thinking, and the idea does not seem so preposterous as at first sight. Oysters are usually presumed to become polluted by town sewage, but infection from a ship is equally possible. Just for amusement, let us compare the chances of a battleship anchored off Portsmouth as against those of the town itself in infecting a local oyster bed. The population of Portsmouth is about 250,000 men, women and children, that of a modern battleship about 1,000 adult men. The town would produce less than 200 times as much human excrement as the ship, and probably considerably less than 100 times as many typhoid bacilli as a ship definitely infected with Bacillus typhosus. The town bacilli would run the gauntlet of the sewage system, and doubtless less than half of them would be alive at' the outfalls. The chances of the town rather than a battleship in the harbour infecting a given local oyster are therefore not likely to be more than fifty to one in favour of the town. Such odds are often not considered absolutely hopeless on a racecourse. Considered from this point of view the quaint conceit that the Formi(able's cooper should have infected the Euryalus officers is not so far fetched as it might appear. In fact,'one begins to wonder how far shipping is an important source of estuary pollution, seeing that under favourable conditions of wind, tide and position of ship, intestinal organisms might arrive on the feeding grounds of fish in better condition and larger numbers than similar organisms which have been exposed to the devitalizing effects of crude town sewage.
The supporters of the "carrier hypothesis " have been accused of exaggerating the importance of the carrier as a source of typhoid bacilli. It is only because " cases without symptoms " so easily escape observation and creep through sanitary barriers that carriers have any special importance, and it is not until countries have advanced far enough to control their " cases with symptoms," that the practical sanitarian need concern himself with carriers. In former days typhoid fever was chiefly water-borne, and only when human excreta were kept out of the water supply was it worth dealing with other sources of Bacillus typhosus. After water had been rendered safe, attention was attracted to certain foods, especially uncooked vegetables which were likely to get in contact with polluted water or human manure. This source of infection was fairly easy to control. Later, uncooked shellfish were recognized as typhoid " carriers." This was chiefly due to an event in 1902, when 195 of the guests who had eaten oysters at two Mayoral banquets given on the same day developed gastrointestinal symptoms. Twenty of these victims were proved to have typhoid fever. Because of this disaster oysters were boycotted to a great extent and measures were taken to render oysters free from typhoid bacilli. The oyster thrives best in not too salt water, and flourishes near sewage outfalls. Therefore, oyster beds are generally found in estuaries where the salinity is lowered by the influx of sewage-polluted water. The oyster is designed to strain off bacteria contained in the water that continually passes through its gills. A better mechanism for collecting a dangerous dose of parasitic bacilli from a harmless concentration in water, and reconveying them to their hosts, could scarcely be devised.
All Naval medical officers are well acquainted with the shellfish danger, as cases often occur at the Naval bases and are generally easily traced, because sailors do not often get shellfish and therefore remember the occasions when they do. A characteristic of shellfish infection is that more than one species of pathogenic organism may be concerned. This is'to be expected, for in sewage-contaminated water containing a dangerous amount of typhoid bacilli, there are bound to be other noxious organisms as well; and the oyster of course will concentrate other organisms in addition to B. typhosus. For example, at the banquets mentioned above, only 10 per cent. of the victims were cases of typhoid fever, and in the outbreak in H.M.S. Euryalus in 1914, thirty officers ate oysters on one day and twenty-eight suffered for it, but only four (14 per cent.) developed true typhoid fever. Oysters clear themselves in about a fortnight of dangerous organisms when laid in water known to be free from pollution, therefore they should always be " relaid " in pure water before they are marketed. Fortunately, salt water and crude sewage are not favourable environments for B. typhosus, will not survive long in them, otherwise molluscs would be a more dangerous source of enteric microbes than they are. The control of shellfish was hoped to account for most of the residual typhoid in England which remained after water and sewage had come under control. But the result has been disappointing, perhaps because of infection, previously referred to, whiGh Sir William Hamer has sbown to occur in fried-fish shops.
It is a cynical fact that with great care and trouble we separate our egesta from our ingesta by instituting a safe water supply and a sound conservancy system, and having done so, we then mix them again in the river estuaries inhabited by fish and molluscs who strain off microbes from excrement. These animals are caught for food, and bring the microbes they have collected back to the towns from which they came, to circulate once more through the human gut, down the drain, into the estuary, and back via the fish market to the dining table. Another means by which B. typhosus is sometimes carried from host to host is on dust and insects, especially house flies, who live on human food and sometimes breed in human faeces. These sources of infection are important in military campaigns where the proper disposal of excreta is difficult to control.
The study of the relationship between the host species man and his specific parasite B. typhosus, introduces fundamental principles of wide application; especially the importance of a true concept of biological relations between host and parasite, and the latter's means of dissemination. In this connexion it is well to remind oneself that the meaning of words is continually changing. The words used in a scientific paper are unimportant in themselves provided they convey the meaning that the author intends. For example, according to some authorities it is more correct nowadays to call Bacillus typhosus, Bacterium typhosum, but both names refer to the same specific obligatory parasite of man, and the former name is more widely understood at present. All living organisms dependent on another specific living organism must of necessity find means of transport from one individual host to another of the same species, otherwise the dependent species will not survive. The obligatory parasite of man, B. typhosus, is carried from host to host in food and water; sometimes two vehicles are used in transmission, as when flies convey typhoid bacilli from faeces to food, or when rivers carry infected sewage to the feeding grounds of fish. Such are the means employed by B. typhosus to disseminate its progeny throughout the world in search of suitable fresh environments to colonize. Man is the only natural environment (as far as is known) to which B. typhosus is adapted and in which it can multiply to any extent. The vehicles employed in its dissemination from host to host are literally more carriers of B. typhosus than those of its hosts who have no symptoms. Although custom has assigned to the latter the name " carrier" yet it-might have been easier to obtain a truer concept of the place of the " germ carrier " in epidemiology had he originally been christened by some other name, such as " tolerant host" or " invisible case." The problem to the parasite of finding a new host is fundamentally the same whether that host is termed a case or a carrier. If these simple biological principles are continually borne in mind it is easier to onvisage the parts played by fried fish, a bacillus, or a ship's cook, in the spread of intestinal infections. and Surgeon Commander Parker, D.S.C., R.N., for valuable information with which they have assisted me in preparing this paper.
General HARVEY said the question of contact or healthy carriers had always been of importance, but in his experience he had not found any such people even after very careful and prolonged search. For instance, in India, they had examined over 500 men contacts with enteric fever cases and had found two carriers on one occasion; but these two men both gave a history of recent fever and were probably convalescent carriers. On the other hand, on following up actual cases of enteric, all were found to be passing the bacillus at some time or other, and about 10 per cent. were still carrying three months after the fever.
The rise in agglutination titre among contacts was most interesting, but had not been noticed by us. At present an investigation of the Widal reactions of inoculated men who had been in contact with cases and presumably in danger of infection was proceeding in Shanghai, but the figures had not yet been received.
The mechanism of the carrier condition was also very important; in his opinion a blood infection was necessary before the carrier condition became established even in the " healthy " carrier.
As regards inoculation, we were quite agreed that our present vaccine was not a complete protection; but, as Commander Dudley had pointed out, although enteric cases did occur in inoculated populations, the disease did not spread but was limited to certain individuals.
